Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1999

Utah v. Barbara Dehart : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Jan Graham; Utah Attorney General; Laura B. Dupaix; Assistant Attorney General; Michael Wims;
Herbert Gillespie; Attorneys for Appellee.
G. Fred Metos; Attorney for Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. Barbara Dehart, No. 990793 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1999).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/2346

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Plaintiff/Appellee,

Case No.

990793-CA

BARBARA DEHART,
Priority No. 2
Appellant/Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR DUCHESNE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
HONORABLE A. LYNN PAYNE, JUDGE PRESIDING

G. FRED METOS - 2250
Attorney for Appellant
10 West Broadway, Suite 650
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801)364-6474

Jan Graham - 1231
Utah Attorney General
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854
Telephone:(801 )366-0180

FILED
Utah Court of AppulO

MAY 3 0 2000
Julia D'Alesandro
Clerk of tr» Court

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Plaintiff/Appellee,

(tiue No

t

)W?\i.\

IA

BARBARA DEHART,
Priority No. 2
Appellant/Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR DUCHESNE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
HONORABLE A. LYNN PAYNE, JUDGE PRESIDING

G. FRED METOS - 2250
Attorney for Appellant
10 West Broadway, Suite 650
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801)364-6474

Jan Graham - 1231
Utah Attorney General
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854
Telephone:(801 )366-0180

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

1

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

1

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR APPEAL

1

STANDARD OF REVIEW

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

2

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

3

APPLICABLE STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

7

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

7

ARGUMENT

8
POINT I
THE APPELLANT'S CONVICTION WAS IMPROPERLY
BASED ON HER STATEMENTS THAT WERE NOT
SUPPORTED BY A CORPUS DELECTI

8

POINT II
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH THE
OFFENSE OF OBSTRUCTING JUSTICE
CONCLUSION

20
28

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES CITED
Provo Citv v. Spotts, 861 P.2d 437 (Utah App. 1993)
State v. Bingham, 575 P.2d 197 (Utah, 1978)
State v. Hansen, 557 P.2d 978 (Utah App. 1993)
-i-

9, 10
25
8

Page
State v. Harmon. 767 P.2d 567 (Utah App. 1989)
State v. Johnson. 821 P.2d 1150 (Utah, 1991)
State v. Knoefler. 563 P.2d 175 (Utah, 1971)
State v. Petersen. 841 P.2d 21 (Utah App. 1992)
State v. Welden. 314 P.2d 353 (Utah, 1957)
State v. Workman. 806 P.2d 1198 (Utah App. 1991)
Warqzower v. United States. 312 U.S. 342 (1941)

2, 20
2, 8, 9, 10, 12, 14, 19
9
20
9
27, 28
10

STATUTES CITED
U.C.A §76-8-305

1,7

ii

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
Case No.

990793CA

BARBARA DEHART,
Priority No. 2
Appellant/Appellant.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This appeal is made pursuant to Rule 26(2)(a) of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure and Rule 3(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. This court has
appellate jurisdiction of this case pursuant to Title 78, Part 2a, Section 3(2) of the
Utah Code (1953 as amended).
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal of right after a jury trial. The appeal is taken from a final
judgement of conviction for one count of obstructing justice a second degree felony,
in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-8-305(b) and (c) (1953 as amended).

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR APPEAL
Did the State establish a corpus delecti for the offense of obstructing justice
which would allow the use of appellant's out of court statements as a basis for the
conviction?
Was the evidence sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant committed the offense of obstructing justice?

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The issue of the sufficiency of proof of a corpus delecti is a legal issue that is
reviewed for correctness. State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150 (Utah, 1991). The issue
of the sufficiency of the evidence is reviewed to determine if the evidence is
sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have
entertained a reasonable doubt that the appellant committed the offense. State v.
Harmon, 767 P.2d 567 (Utah App. 1989).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant was charged in a one count Information (R. 5-6) That Information
alleged that the appellant committed the offense of obstructing justice, a second
degree felony a violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-8-306 (1953 as amended) (R. 5-6)
The case was tried to a jury on June 15, 16 and 17, 1999, in the Eighth Judicial
District Court, before the Honorable Lynn Payne. (R. 131-138) The jury convicted the
appellant as charged. (R. 107) On August 16, 1999, the appellant's motion for arrest
of judgement was denied. (R. 213, p.5) Sentence was imposed on that same date. (R.
167-171) The appellant was sentenced to serve a one to fifteen year commitment at
the Utah State Prison. That commitment was stayed and the appellant was placed on
probation. As a condition of probation appellant was required to serve a twelve (12)
month jail sentence. (R. 167-171) A notice of appeal was filed on September 14,
1999. (R. 172)
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
For several days prior to October 29, 1998, Becky Young, had been unable to
contact her friends, June Flood and Rex Tanner. (R. 210, p. 21) On that date, she
went to their residence in Duchesne County to visit them personally. (R. 210, p. 21)
Nobody answered when she knocked on the door. (R. 210, p. 21) She entered the
residence and described what she observed as a "disaster" (R. 210, p. 21) On the
evening of October 30, 1998, Duchesne County deputy sheriffs located a human hip
socket on a road on a ranch belonging to John Pinder. (R. 210, p. 24) A search
warrant was obtained and on October 3 1 , 1998, additional body parts were located
on the Pinder Ranch. (R. 210, pp. 38-39) A search of the Tanner and Flood residence
on November 3, 1998, resulted in the discovery of clothing that matched that found
on the body parts that were located on the Pinder ranch. (R. 210, p. 53) Ultimately,
it was determined that the body parts located on the ranch belonged to Tanner and
Flood. (R. 210, pp. 35-41)
On November 5, 1998, the appellant and John Pinder were in Las Vegas,
Nevada. (R. 2 1 1 , p. 249) Pinder contacted his attorneys who informed him that there
was an arrest warrant for him for the Tanner and Flood homicides. (R. 2 1 1 , pp. 249250) The attorneys advised Pinder to have the appellant leave him in Las Vegas and
that she should go home to Northern Idaho. (R. 2 1 1 , pp. 249-250) Prior to the
issuance of that warrant, the media had published the fact that John Pinder was not
a suspect in the homicides. (R. 2 1 1 , pp. 174-175) The chief investigator on the case,
Duchesne County Sheriff, Sergeant Wallace Hendricks, testified that around November
-3-

4, 1998, he was in contact with John Pinder's lawyers. (R. 2 1 1 , p. 175) Hendricks
acknowledged that he was attempting to negotiate terms through these lawyers under
which law enforcement officers could interview Pinder. (R. 2 1 1 , p. 175) Hendricks
also acknowledged that this was the appropriate way to deal with a situation when a
witness or suspect is represented by counsel. (R. 2 1 1 , p. 175)
During the week between the end of October 1998, and November 5, 1998, the
appellant had traveled from the Pinder Ranch in Duchesne County, Utah, to the
appellant's home in Caltaldo, Idaho, back through Utah and finally to Nevada. (R. 2 1 1 ,
pp. 2 1 1 , 225, 233, 237, 250) Prior to this time, the appellant and Pinder had known
each other for about fifteen years. (R. 2 1 1 , p. 207) The appellant had been married
to Kurt DeHart since 1972. (R. 2 1 1 , p. 204) On September 22, 1998, the appellant
announced that she was leaving her husband of twenty years to live with Pinder. (R.
211, p. 207) Pinder had planned to move from Utah to Northern, Idaho, where he had
business interests. (R. 2 1 1 , p. 208) After making this announcement, the appellant
and Pinder drove to Utah. (R. 2 1 1 , p. 210) They returned within the week with some
of Pinder's property. They also wanted to be present for the birth of appellant's
grandchild. They then traveled to Oregon and Washington. (R. 2 1 1 , p. 214)
The two returned to Utah around October 23, 1998, and stayed at Pinder's
Ranch in Duchesne. (R. 2 1 1 , pp. 216-217) Around October 26, 1998, the appellant
phoned her daughter, Melissa Cowles, (R. 2 1 1 , pp. 75, 272-273) The appellant said
that she told Cowles that things were not working out as she had hoped and that she
wanted to return to Idaho. (R. 2 1 1 , pp. 75, 273) Melissa testified that the appellant
-4-

had indicated that Pinder and Filo Ruiz, a ranch hand, had been gone all night. (R. 211,
p. 75) Cowles testified that in a later call the appellant testified that there was "a big
mess" and that ". . it's horrible."

(R. 211, p. 76) Cowles testified that on the

following day, the appellant called her and said that she and Pinder would be coming
to Idaho on October 30. (R. 211, p. 76) Cowles indicated that her mother had stated
that Pinder first had to meet with his attorneys and that they would bring a cage and
other property for Pinder's pet lion to Idaho. (R. 211, p. 78)
Melissa Coles testified about several conversations that she had with her mother
while the appellant and Pinder were in Idaho. Cowles claimed that the appellant had
said that Pinder had admitted to killing the people on the ranch. (R. 211, p. 80) Coles
further claimed that the appellant had said that she and Pinder washed and vacuumed
the car and disposed of bloody hair and scalp. (R. 211, p. 81) Melissa also said that
the appellant had burned Pinder's bloody clothes and thrown the murder weapon into
a river. (R. 2 1 1 , p. 82) She also testified that appellant stated that her "soon to be
step daddy" is a murderer and that she and Pinder were just like Bonnie and Clyde. (R.
211, pp. 82-83)

Cowles testified that her mother later said that others had planted

evidence in Pinder's truck and they had to clean up the evidence so that Pinder would
not get into trouble for something he did not do. (R. 2 1 1 , p. 83)
On October 3 1 , 1998, the appellant and Pinder arrived at appellant's home in
Cataldo, Idaho. (R. 2 1 1 , p. 77) The two visited with appellant's family and went to a
local bar to watch her brother play in a band. (R. 211, p. 269) Pinder left a trailer
containing some of his property at appellant's home. (R. 2 1 1 , p. 267) During that trip,
-5-

Pinder was in contact with his attorneys. (R. 2 1 1 , pp. 230-231) Pinder told the
appellant that his attorneys requested that he return to Utah. (R. 2 1 1 , p. 231) After
meeting with the appellant on November 2, 1998, (R. 2 1 1 , p. 239) Pinder told the
appellant that the attorneys would tell him if he became a suspect in the homicides.
(R. 2 1 1 , p. 238) He indicated that he was to "stay in touch with the attorneys and to
stay out of the limelight." (R. 2 1 1 , p. 238)
From November 2 through 4, the appellant and Pinder stayed in a motel in
Ogden, Utah. (R. 2 1 1 , p. 242) Appellant testified that they were also receiving
information from the media. (R. 2 1 1 , p. 242) That included some false information
that her father gave to a newspaper. (R. 2 1 1 , p. 239) On November 4, 1998, Pinder
decided that he wanted to tell his side of the story. (R. 2 1 1 , p. 246) The two went to
the KSL television studio in Salt Lake City, Utah and did a 45 minute video taped
interview. (R. 2 1 1 , p. 157) The two then drove to Nevada where, Pinder was informed
that there was a warrant for his arrest. (R. 2 1 1 , p. 250) On the advice of Pinder's
lawyers, appellant and Pinder parted company. (R. 2 1 1 , p. 250)
The appellant arrived at her Idaho home on November 7, 1998. (R. 2 1 1 , p. 170)
She was met there by Sargent Hendricks. (R. 2 1 1 , p. 170) Hendricks testified that the
appellant told him she had been driving around with Pinder and had dropped him off
in Las Vegas. (R. 2 1 1 , p. 171) Hendricks also testified that the appellant had told him
that she had given John Pinder her .380 semi-automatic handgun. (R. 2 1 1 , p. 171)
The appellant testified that she had not given the gun to John Pinder, rather she had
given the gun to John Pinder's father, Robert Pinder. (R. 2 1 1 , p. 249)
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APPLICABLE STATUTES
AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Utah Code Ann. §76-8-306, Obstructing Justice:
(1) A person is guilty of an offense, if with intent to hinder,
prevent, or delay the discovery, apprehension, prosecution,
conviction, or punishment of another for the commission of
a crime, he:. . .
(b) harbors or conceals the offender;
(c) provides the offender a weapon, transportation,
disguise, or other means for avoiding discovery or
apprehension; . . .
(e) conceals, destroys, or alters any physical evidence
that might aid in the discovery, apprehension, or conviction
of the person;. . .
(2) An offense under Subsection (1 )(a) through (f) is a class
B misdemeanor, unless the actor knows that the offender
committed a capital offense or a felony of the first degree,
in which case of the offense is a second degree felony.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The corpus delecti rule requires that the state prove that a specified injury
occurred and that injury was caused by criminal conduct before a criminal defendant's
statements may be used as a basis for a conviction. The corpus delecti must be
established by clear and convincing evidence. There was insufficient evidence to
establish that appellant harbored or concealed John Pinder, or provided him with a
weapon or transportation to avoid discovery or apprehension. Likewise, the requisite
intent for the offense of obstructing justice was not established without the appellant's
statements.
The state also failed to establish that the appellant committed the offense of
obstructing justice, even with the use of her statements, under any of the alternative
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theories alleged in the information. Appellant's actions in transporting Pinder and
providing him with a place to stay did not constitute the offense of obstructing justice.
ARGUMENT
POINT 1
THE APPELLANT'S CONVICTION WAS IMPROPERLY
BASED ON HER STATEMENTS THAT WERE NOT
SUPPORTED BY A CORPUS DELECTI.
The appellant was convicted of one count of violating Utah Code Ann. §76-8306. (1953 as amended), obstructing justice. At the end of the State's case and in
a motion to arrest judgement, appellant moved to dismiss this charge based on a
failure to establish a corpus delecti. (R. 2 1 1 , p. 189, R. 213 p.5) Both of those motions
were denied by the trial court. (R. 2 1 1 , p.96) The question of the sufficiency of the
corpus delecti is a question of law and is reviewed for correctness. State v. Johnson,
supra.
The corpus delecti rule has been utilized in two alternative fashions. First, it has
been used as a foundational requirement to establish the admissibility of statements
by a defendant. See: State v. Johnson, supra. It has also been used as a basis to
dismiss a criminal charge.

The grounds for the dismissal are that there was no

independent corroborative evidence of the corpus delecti and a defendant's statements
alone cannot support a verdict of guilt. State v. Hansen, 557 P.2d 978 (Utah App.
1993).

In this case, there is no difference in these two forms of relief.

This is

because, if the state cannot meet the requirement of proof of a corpus delecti and the
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defendant's statements are not admissible, the evidence will be insufficient to support
the conviction and the charge will have to be dismissed.
The corpus delecti rule is designed to provide a ". . . safeguard against
convicting the innocent on the strength of false confessions." State v. Weldenf 314
P.2d 353 at 354 (Utah, 1957). To that end, the "corpus delecti must be established
through evidence, independent of the confession or admission, that 'the injury
specified occurred and that such injury was caused by someone's criminal conduct'"
State v. Johnson, supra, at 1162. In State v. Johnson, supra, the court indicated,
Our past cases have consistently required that the
independent evidence show two things: (i) "that a wrong,
an injury, or damage has been done," and (ii) "that such
was effected by a criminal agency, i.e., without right or by
unlawful means."

821 P.2d at 1162. The court noted that this rule does not require the State to prove
that the accused is the guilty agent to establish the corpus delecti. Finally, the court
held that the corpus delecti must be established by clear and convincing evidence.
The two things that must be proved to established the corpus delecti relate to
the elements of the offense charged. Examples of this can be found in State v.
Knoefler, 563 P.2d 175, (Utah, 1971) and Provo Citv v. Sootts, 861 P.2d 437 (Utah
App. 1993).

In Knoefler, the defendant had been convicted of causing an injury

accident while driving under the influence of alcohol. The court found that the corpus
delecti of that offense was established by the evidence of a two car accident, the
occupants of the vehicle that caused the accident appeared to be intoxicated and the
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defendant had a .21 blood alcohol level. That evidence was sufficient to make the
defendant's admission that he was the driver of the vehicle admissible. In Spotts, the
defendant had been charged with possession of a controlled substance. The factual
basis for the conviction was that the defendant had possessed marijuana by smoking
it. The court held that the two aspects of the corpus delecti that had to be established
were that (1) the marijuana had been inhaled, and (2) that act was done knowingly and
intentionally.
In the instant case, the offense of obstructing justice required proof of two
elements. First, the defendant harbored or concealed an offender or provided the
offender with a weapon, transportation or other means for avoiding discovery.
Second, those acts were done with the intent to hinder, prevent, or delay the
discovery, apprehension, prosecution, conviction or punishment of another for the
commission of a crime. These two elements would also constitute the two aspects
of the corpus delecti that would have to be established in this case.
The final aspect of the corpus delecti rule that was discussed in Johnson was
when the statements were made in relation to the commission of the offense. The
court concluded that the rule does not apply to admissions or confessions that were
made either prior to or during the commission of the offense.

In reaching this

conclusion the court in Johnson relied on the reasoning of the Supreme Court in
Warazower v. United States, 312 U.S. 342 (1941). In that case, the defendant had
been charged with obtaining a passport by false statements. The evidence introduced
to establish the falsity of the statements that were the subject of the offense included
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the defendant's statements that were made prior to the commission of the offense.
The Court held that the rule requiring corroboration of confessions is based on the
need to protect the administration of the criminal law against errors in convictions
based upon untrue confessions alone. The Court went on to hold that statements
made prior to the commission of the offense that was at issue contained none of the
inherent weaknesses of confessions or admissions made after the fact.
The facts that were established independent of the appellant's statements in the
instant case fail to establish either of the corpus delecti requirements. The State
introduced evidence that prior to October 29, 1998, two homicides occurred on the
ranch belonging to John Pinder. (R. 210, p.21) On October 30, 1998, Pinder and the
appellant arrived at appellant's home in Cataldo, Idaho. (R. 211, p. 77) The appellant's
family, including her estranged husband were aware that appellant and Pinder were
staying at the house. (R. 2 1 1 , pp.79, 126, 140) The two had driven to Idaho in
Pinder's truck and towed a trailer with Pinder's property to appellant's home. (R. 211,
pp.79, 126) That trailer and other property were left at the house. (R. 2 1 1 , p. 140)
Appellant and Pinder left Idaho on November 1, 1998. (R. 211, p.86) They were
at the KSL television studio on November 4, 1998. (R. 2 1 1 , p. 157) A video taped
interview was made with Pinder in which he denied participating in the homicides. (R.
211, p. 157) The appellant sat next to Pinder during the interview. (R. 2 1 1 , p.157) The
two were photographed leaving in appellant's vehicle. (R. 2 1 1 , p. 157) On November
5, 1998, the appellant registered at a motel in Mesquite, Nevada. (R. 211, p. 159) She
used an incorrect license number for her vehicle and the registration indicated that two
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people would occupy the room. (R. 211, p.110) The clerk did not observe John Pinder
at the motel. (R. 2 1 1 , p.160) In fact, the clerk did not observe any other person with
the appellant. (R. 2 1 1 , p.160) Appellant was next observed arriving at her home in
Cataldo, Idaho alone in her vehicle on November 7, 1998. (Tr.170)
The other pieces of evidence that were introduced independent of the
appellant's statement included testimony that at that time in question she did own a
handgun. (R. 2 1 1 , pp.88, 144) John Pinder had left property at appellant's home in
Cataldo and left his truck at his home in a nearby town. (Tr. 2 1 1 , p. 86) Certain areas
on Pinder's truck's window and body appeared to have been wiped clean. (R. 2 1 1 ,
pp.166-168) A small bag containing a T-shirt with Pinder's blood on it was left in the
house in Idaho. (R. 2 1 1 , p. 140) Finally, Sergeant Hendricks acknowledged that during
this time period, he had been in contact with Pinder's lawyers to attempt to negociate
an interview with Pinder. (R. 2 1 1 , p. 174)
The appellant made several telephone calls to her daughter, Melissa Cowles,
prior to the time that the appellant and Pinder traveled to Idaho. (R. 2 1 1 , pp.75-76)
These statements by the appellant preceded any alleged criminal involvement by the
appellant. Consequently, those statements would not be subject to the corpus delecti
rule.

State v. Johnson, supra.

Cowles testified that in a series of telephone

conversations on October 26, 1998, the appellant told her that Pinder and Filo Ruiz,
one of Pinder's ranch hands, had been out all night. (R. 2 1 1 , p.75) Appellant said that
she thought Pinder may be cheating on her. (R. 211, p.75) That conversation occurred
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about 11:30 p.m. (R. 2 1 1 , p.75) It ended when appellant indicated that Pinder had just
arrived home. (R. 2 1 1 , p.76)
Cowles testified that appellant called back about one half hour later and was
very upset. (R. 2 1 1 , p.76) Cowles said that appellant indicated that things were a "big
mess" and that she wanted to come home. (R. 2 1 1 , p.76) Cowles indicated that
appellant would not tell her what happened over the telephone, but indicated, "It's just
horrible." (R. 2 1 1 , p.76) Cowles also testified that appellant called again the following
day and indicated that she and Pinder were going to meet with his attorneys, then they
would be traveling to Idaho. (R. 2 1 1 , p.76) The appellant told Cowles that appellant
and Pinder would be bringing a cage and meat to Idaho for Pinder's pet lion. (R. 2 1 1 ,
p.76) Cowles testified that she was aware that Pinder and appellant had previously
brought property to Idaho in anticipation of their moving into appellant's house in
Idaho. (R. 2 1 1 , p.77)
The October 30 and 31 Statements
Melissa Cowles testified that she had several conversations with the appellant
regarding the murders at the Pinder ranch after the appellant returned to Idaho on
October 30, 1998. (R. 2 1 1 , pp.78-83) Cowles testified that on October 30, 1998, the
appellant told her that Filo Ruiz had been arrested for murder and that she and Pinder
may have to go to Utah to be questioned by the police. (R. 2 1 1 , p.78) Cowles claimed
that two days later, appellant told her that Pinder had admitted to doing the murders
on the ranch. (R. 2 1 1 , p.80) Cowles also claimed that appellant described how she
and Pinder had cleaned bloody hair and pieces of scalp from Pinder's truck. (R. 2 1 1 ,
-13-

p.81) Cowles stated that appellant told her that she and Pinder had burned bloody
clothes and thrown away the murder weapon. (R. 2 1 1 , p.82) Melissa Cowles husband,
Damien, testified that he was present when the appellant had this discussion with
Melissa. (R. 2 1 1 , pp..127-128) 1
Both Melissa and Damien Cowles stated that later in the day, the appellant said
that Pinder was not involved in the murders. (R. 2 1 1 , pp.83, 128) Melissa Cowles
acknowledged that they were upset because the appellant had left her husband,
Melissa's father, to live with Pinder. (R. 211, pp.121) Damen Cowles also
acknowledged that he had reviewed transcripts of his wife's interviews and talked to
her about what she had said to the investigators prior to testifying. (R. 2 1 1 , p.130,
132) Damien Cowles admitted that prior to appellant's trial, he had never told law
enforcement agents that appellant had made statements about Pinder claiming to be
involved in the murders. (R. 2 1 1 , p.133)
Technically, under the court's ruling in Johnson, these statements would not be
subject to the corpus delecti rule. That is because they could be construed as being
made during the commission of the offense. However, the circumstances surrounding
the testimony and the nature of the statements bring them within the policy that
provides the basis for the rule. As discussed in Johnson the reasons for the rule are

1

The jury found insufficient evidence to establish the alternative of the
obstruction of justice charge relating to the destruction of evidence. (R. 105-106.)
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to prevent the admission of statements that are not true or to base a conviction for a
crime on statements of a defendant that are untrue or lack credibility.
These statements fall into that category. The witnesses who testified about the
statements both indicated that appellant later changed her story about Pinder's
involvement in the homicides. Both witnesses also had a general motive to falsify the
appellant's statements due to her estrangement from her husband and her relationship
to Pinder. In her testimony, the appellant denied making those statements. (R. 211,
pp. 234-256) Finally, the jury found the appellant not guilty of the acts of evidence
destruction that appellant described in the same conversations in which she made the
statements about Pinder's involvement in the homicides. (R. 105-106) That
demonstrates that the jury did not believe critical parts of the testimony of Melissa and
Damien Cowles. For these reasons, the statements should be subject to the corpus
delecti rule.
The two requirements of the corpus delicti rule cannot be met with respect to
these statements.

The act that needs to be established involves the harboring,

concealing, transporting of Pinder or providing him with a disguise or other means of
avoiding discovery or apprehension. The state did not introduce any evidence that law
enforcement officers were attempting to locate John Pinder.

The only evidence

introduced on this issue was the testimony of Sargent Hendricks who indicated he was
in touch with Pinder's lawyers and was attempting to negociate an interview with
Pinder through the lawyers. (R. 2 1 1 , p. 175)
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The evidence indicated that it was Pinder's truck that was driven to Idaho. (R.
211, p. 140) Appellant did not provide the transportation to get there. The evidence
also showed that Pinder and appellant had prior plans to move to Idaho. (R. 2 1 1 , p.
77) Pinder brought a trailer with more of his property on this trip. (R. 2 1 1 , p. 140)
There was no evidence that Pinder was in disguise or made any attempt to conceal
himself while in Idaho. Based on these facts, the evidence was neither clear nor
convincing to establish any of the acts required to prove the first aspect of the corpus
delecti rule.
The second aspect of the corpus delecti rule in this case relates to the intent
requirement for the offense of obstruction of justice. That requires the State to prove
by clear and convincing evidence that the act was done with the intent to hinder,
prevent, or delay the discovery, apprehension, prosecution, conviction or punishment
of another for the commission of a crime. The only evidence that was admitted on
this issue would be the travel to Idaho and the appellant's October 26 and 27, 1998,
telephone calls.

This evidence was contradicted by the testimony of Sargent

Hendricks when he indicated that he was negotiating for an interview with Pinder with
Pinder's lawyers. (R. 2 1 1 , p.174) This does not constitute clear and convincing
evidence that the appellant acted with the appropriate intent to either make the
appellant's statements admissible or to provide a basis for the conviction of the
offense of obstructing justice.
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Appellant's Statements About Providing
Pinder with A Weapon
On November 7, 1998, Sargent Hendricks interviewed the appellant at her home
in Idaho. (R. 2 1 1 , pp.170-172) Hendricks testified that during the interview appellant
stated that she had given Pinder her Browning .380 automatic handgun. (R. 2 1 1 ,
p. 171) This was done before Pinder was left in Las Vegas. (R. 2 1 1 , p. 171) One of
the potential alternatives for which appellant was convicted was that she provided the
offender with a weapon. (R. 5-6)
The first aspect of the corpus delecti rule for this alternative would require clear
and convincing evidence that Pinder was in possession of a firearm sometime after the
homicides had occurred. The only evidence that the State introduced on this issue
was the testimony of the appellant's daughter, Melissa Cowles, and her estranged
husband, Kurt DeHart. Cowles testified that in October and November, 1998, the
appellant owned a .30 caliber Browning automatic. (R. 2 1 1 , p.88) Kurt DeHart testified
that during that time frame the appellant owned a .380 automatic. (R. 2 1 1 , p. 144)
A .380 caliber semi-automatic pistol was introduced into evidence, the parties
stipulated that it was seized from the appellant on May 13, 1999. (R. 212, p. 315)
Although the trial court ruled that this evidence was sufficient to establish a corpus
delecti, it does not raise to the level of clear and convincing evidence that Pinder had
possession of a handgun during the relevant period of time.
The intent requirement for this alternative of the obstruction of justice statute
is the same as was previously described. The evidence that was introduced by the
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State to established that requirement is also the same as previously discussed. As
was previously discussed, the evidence to establish this requirement is neither clear
nor convincing. The State failed to establish a corpus delecti for this statement and
alternative charge of providing the offender with a firearm. This statement cannot be
used as a basis for the conviction of the appellant.
Appellant's Statement About Travel
to Nevada with Pinder
In the same interview in which Sargent Hendricks claimed that appellant stated
that she provided Pinder with a firearm, she was questioned about where she and
Pinder had been. (R. 2 1 1 , pp. 170-171) Hendricks testified that appellant said that she
had been driving around with Pinder and had dropped him off in Las Vegas after Pinder
learned he had been charged with murder. (R. 2 1 1 , p. 171)
Independent of this statement, the only evidence of appellant's travel was the
motel registration from Mesquite, Nevada. (R. 2 1 1 , p. 159) That registration indicated
that appellant registered at the Virgin River Hotel in Mesquite, Nevada, on November
5, 1998. (R. 2 1 1 , pp. 159-160) The registration indicated that two people would be
staying in the room. (R. 2 1 1 , p. 160) However, the hotel clerk never saw the second
occupant. (R. 2 1 1 , p. 160) The evidence also indicated that the appellant provided an
incorrect license plate number for her vehicle on the hotel registration. (R. 2 1 1 , p. 160)
These facts fail to establish the first requirement of the corpus delecti rule.
Other than the appellant's statement, there was no evidence introduced that would
indicate that appellant transported Pinder to Nevada. Likewise, there is no additional
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evidence to meet the second requirement of the corpus delecti rule. The evidence
related to the requirement has previously been discussed. The additional information
from the hotel registration does not meet the clear and convincing burden of proof on
this issue. (R. 2 1 1 , p. 160)
These facts fail to establish the first requirement of the corpus delecti rule.
Other than the appellant's statement, there was no evidence introduced that would
indicate that appellant transported Pinder to Nevada. Likewise, there is no additional
evidence to meet the second requirement of the corpus delecti rule. The evidence
related to that requirement has previously been discussed. The additional information
from the motel registration does not establish this requirement by clear and convincing
evidence.
The Failure to Meet The Corpus Delecti Rule
Requires Entry of A Judgement of Acquittal,
The state failed to meet the corpus delecti requirement for any of the
alternatives to the offense of obstructing justice that was alleged in the information.
Clearly, without the appellant's statements, the offense of obstructing justice cannot
be established. That is because the corpus delecti must be established by clear and
convincing evidence. State v. Johnson, supra. If the appellant's statements cannot
be utilized due to a failure to meet that burden, the higher reasonable doubt standard
cannot be met. That means that the judgment and conviction must be reversed and
this court should remand the case to the district court with an order that a judgement
of acquittal be entered.
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POINT II
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH THE
OFFENSE OF OBSTRUCTING JUSTICE.
An appellate court reviews the jury's finding of guilt to determine if the evidence
was sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have
entertained a reasonable doubt that the appellant committed the offense. State v.
Harmon, supra.

In arguing the sufficiency of the evidence, the appellant is also

required to marshall all of the evidence relevant to that issue that was presented at
trial. State v. Petersen, 841 P.2d 21 (Utah. App. 1992).
The jury convicted the appellant of the offense of obstructing justice. (Tr. 105106) That offense required proof that the appellant acted with the intent to hinder,
prevent or delay the discovery, apprehension, prosecution, conviction or punishment
of the crimes of murder or aggravated murder. (R. 105) The jury also found that the
appellant committed two of the alternative acts alleged in the information that
constitute the offense of obstructing justice. (R. 105-106) Those alternatives were
that the appellant either harbored or concealed the offender (John Pinder), or that she
provided the offender with a weapon, transportation, disguise or other means of
avoiding discovery of apprehension. (R. 106) The jury found there was insufficient
evidence to establish that the appellant concealed, destroyed or altered physical
evidence. (R. 106)

-20-

Harboring or Concealing Pinder
There were two potential ways that the appellant could have committed the
acts required to prove the alternative of harboring or concealing John Pinder. The first
would be based on the evidence that appellant and Pinder stayed in her Idaho home
from October 30, 1998, to November 1, 1998. The second means would relate to the
November 6, 1998, registration in the hotel in Mesquite, Nevada. Neither of these
acts amounted to harboring or concealing Pinder.
The evidence showed that the appellant and Pinder drove in Pinder's truck to
Cataldo, Idaho. (R. 111, p. 77) Pinder parked his truck openly at the house. (R. 211,
p. 77) Appellant's daughter, son in law and estranged husband were all aware that
Pinder either would be or was in fact staying at the house. (R. 2 1 1 , pp. 79, 126, 140)
One evening appellant and Pinder went to a local bar to hear appellant's brother play
in a band. (R. 2 1 1 , p. 269)
These actions must be considered in light of several other critical facts. First,
Pinder was not a stranger to that part of Idaho. He had several business interests
there. (R. 2 1 1 , p. 138) He also had a home in a nearby town. (R. 2 1 1 , p. 144) Local
residents knew both Pinder and the appellant and they would easily be able to report
that information to the authorities. Furthermore, about six weeks earlier, the appellant
had told her husband and her daughter that she was leaving him and was going to
move in and live with Pinder. (R. 2 1 1 , p. 72) Melissa Cowles testified that she was
upset with appellant over that situation. (R. 211, p. 105) Kurt DeHart said that his
divorce from appellant was not a "friendly" proceeding. (R. 2 1 1 , p. 150)
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Evidence was also introduced that established that appellant and Pinder had
prior plans to move into appellant's house in Idaho. (R. 2 1 1 , p. 77) They had
previously taken property there. (R. 211, pp. 72-73) On this particular trip, Pinder
towed a trailer to Idaho that contained a cage and other supplies for his pet lion. (R.
211, p. 267) That trailer and those items were left at the appellant's house in Idaho.
(R. 211 pp. 144) Pinder and appellant left Idaho because Pinder's lawyers had
requested that he return to Utah. (R. 2 1 1 , p. 231)
With respect to the travel to Idaho, the evidence was sufficiently inconclusive
and it was inherently improbable that reasonable minds would not have entertained a
reasonable doubt that the appellant harbored or concealed John Pinder. The two
traveled openly in Pinder's vehicle. Pinder's presence in Idaho was not concealed even
from those who had reasons to bear animosity toward him. The evidence does not
support a conviction based on that factual theory.
The second potential basis to claim that the appellant harbored or concealed
Pinder may be found in the travel to Nevada. As previously discussed, the evidence
showed that the appellant registered for a room in a Mesquite, Nevada, hotel on
November 5, 1998. (R. 2 1 1 , pp. 159-160) The evidence showed that she indicated
on the registration that two people would be staying in the room. (R. 2 1 1 , pp. 159160) The evidence also indicated that appellant gave the wrong license plate number
for her vehicle when she registered. (R. 2 1 1 , pp. 159-160) Pinder had been with the
appellant on the previous night when he did a video taped interview at the KSL
television studio in Salt Lake City, Utah. (R. 2 1 1 , p. 158)
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The motel clerk was able to identify the appellant as the person who registered
at the hotel. (R. 2 1 1 , p. 160) She did not see anybody with the appellant who stayed
in the hotel room. (R. 2 1 1 , p. 160) Appellant testified that she had previously dropped
John Pinder off at a truck stop near Las Vegas, Nevada. (R. 2111 ,p. 248) she testified
that Pinder was not with her when she checked into the hotel in Mesquite, Nevada.
(R. 2 1 1 , p. 277) On November 7, 1998, the appellant arrived at her home in Northern,
Idaho. (R. 2 1 1 , p. 171) John Pinder was not with her. (R. 2 1 1 , p. 171) Appellant
testified that she had left Pinder in Las Vegas, at the request or on the instruction of
Pinder's lawyer. (R. 2 1 1 , p. 248)
The only evidence that Pinder was at the hotel in Mesquite, Nevada, was the
information on the registration card that indicated that two people would be staying
in the room. There is nothing else that places Pinder in that hotel room. This should
be considered in light of Pinder's response to the information from his attorney and the
uncontested evidence that appellant and Pinder parted company in Las Vegas. That
evidence is sufficiently inconclusive such that a reasonable mind must have entertained
a reasonable doubt as to appellant's guilt based on this factual theory. This evidence
fails to establish that the appellant harbored or concealed John Pinder.
Providing a Weapon or Transportation to Avoid Discovery or
Apprehension.
This alternative can also be divided into two categories.

First, there was

testimony that the appellant said that she provided a weapon to John Pinder. Second,
there was evidence that appellant and Pinder drove appellant's vehicle from Idaho to
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Utah and Nevada.

Both of these acts must have been done for the purpose of

avoiding Pinder's discovery or apprehension.
The only evidence that the appellant provided John Pinder with a weapon was
her November 7, 1998, statement to Sargent Hendricks. (R. 2 1 1 , p. 171) The
appellant testified that she did not give a gun to John Pinder on November 6, 1998.
(R. 2 1 1 , p. 249) She testified that she gave her gun to John Pinder's father, Bob
Pinder, prior to the time that she and John Pinder left to go to Nevada. (R. 2 1 1 , p.
249)
Other than appellant's statement, there was no evidence introduced that put
John Pinder in possession of a firearm between November 6, 1998, and the date of
his arrest. Pinder was not arrested with a gun nor was evidence introduced that he
had actually used a firearm to avoid discovery or apprehension. A firearm similar to
that described in appellant's statement was introduced into evidence. That firearm
was seized from the appellant in Idaho on May 13, 1999. (R. 212, p. 315)
The evidence on this alternative is also sufficiently inconclusive such that a
reasonable mind would entertain a reasonable doubt that the appellant provided a
firearm to John Pinder so that he could avoid discovery or apprehension.
Consequently, this alternative does not establish an act that could provide a basis upon
which a conviction for obstructing just may be sustained.
The final alternative act alleged was that the appellant provided transportation
to John Pinder for the purpose of enabling him to avoid discovery or apprehension.
The evidence clearly indicated that when returning from Idaho to Utah the appellant
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and Pinder did drive in appellant's vehicle. Pinder's vehicle was left at his residence
in Rose Lake, Idaho. (R. 2 1 1 , p. 86) When Pinder and appellant went to the KSL
televison studio in Salt Lake City, Utah, they were filmed leaving in appellant's vehicle
with Pinder driving. (R. 211, p. 157) The registration at the hotel in Mesquite, Nevada,
reflected the same make and model vehicle as appellant owned. (R. 211, p. 160)
When appellant arrived at her home on November 7, 1998, she was driving that
vehicle. (R. 2 1 1 , p. 171) At that time the appellant admitted that she drove John
Pinder around and dropped him off in Las Vegas, Nevada. (R. 211, p. 171)
The appellant testified that they went to Salt Lake from Idaho at the request of
Pinder's lawyers. (R. 2 1 1 , p. 231) That is consistent with the testimony of Melissa
Cowles. (R. 2 1 1 , p. 86) At the KSL studio nothing was done to alter, hide or disguise
the license plate. (R. 2 1 1 , p. 158) The plate number was checked and reflected on
vehicle registration in appellant's name for a Toyota 4-Runner. (R. 211, p. 158) that
was the same make and model and color of vehicle reflected on the video tape. (R.
211, p. 158)
These facts can be contrasted to those in State v. Bingham, 575 P.2d 197,
(Utah, 1978) In that case, the defendant and two others were looking for a person
who had earlier been in a fight with one of the defendant's passenger. When that
person's vehicle was found the passengers got out. The defendant heard gun fire and
the passengers returned. Before driving away the defendant bent his license plate so
that it could not be read. The court found that taking the shooter away from the
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potential scene of a crime and altering the license plate in a manner to avoid detection
established the offense of obstructing justice.
In the instant case, there was no attempt made to disguise the vehicle. Pinder's
and appellant's travel was open and subject to being filmed by a television news
cameraman. There was no evidence that the authorities were attempting to discover
or apprehend Pinder. To the contrary, the evidence indicated that law enforcement
officers were in contact with John Pinder's lawyers to attempt to arrange an interview.
The evidence on this alternative is also sufficiently inconclusive such that a reasonable
mind would entertain a reasonable doubt that the appellant provided transportation to
John Pinder so that he could avoid discovery or apprehension. Consequently, this
alternative fails to provide a basis upon which a conviction for the offense of
obstructing justice may be sustained.
The Intent Requirement for Obstructing Justice.
To convict the appellant of obstructing justice, the State had to prove that she
acted with the intent to hinder, prevent or delay the discovery apprehension,
prosecution, conviction or punishment of John Pinder. The statements of appellant
to her daughter, husband and son-in-law indicated that she was aware of the homicide
on the Pinder ranch and the ongoing investigation. (R. 2 1 1 , pp. 78-82, 127, 142) She
also indicated in her statements to others in her testimony that Pinder was dealing
with this through his attorneys. (R. 2 1 1 , pp. 86, 231-238, 248) This was corroborated
by the testimony of Sargent Hendricks who indicted that he was attempting to
negociate an interview with Pinder through Pinder's lawyers. (R. 2 1 1 , p. 174)
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Appellant testified and told others that she and Pinder had to return to Utah
from Idaho at the request of Pinder's attorney. (R. 211, pp. 86, 231) The appellant
met with these attorneys and was told that she and Pinder would be informed if Pinder
became a suspect in the homicides. (R. 211, p. 238) Appellant's testimony and
statement to others indicated that when in Nevada, she and Pinder learned that he had
been charged with committing the homicides. (R. 211, pp. 171, 248) Upon learning
that and upon the advice of Pinder's lawyers, the appellant left Pinder in Las Vegas,
Nevada, and returned to Idaho. (R. 2 1 1 , pp. 171, 248)
A person's intent may also be inferred from her acts. The facts related to the
acts of harboring, concealing or providing transportation or a firearm to Pinder have
previously been discussed. The innocent or at best equivocal nature of those acts
were also described. That same discussion relating to the guilt that can be inferred
from those acts is applicable to the criminal intent issue.
This case is analogous to the situation in State v. Workman, 806 P.2d 1198
(Utah App. 1991). In Workman the defendants, a husband and wife, took a young
man named Clinton Kelly as a house guest. The Workmans had thirteen children
including a seven year old daughter. Kelly was ultimately convicted of sexual abuse
charges relating to that daughter. The Workmans were found guilty by a jury of
obstructing justice with respect to those offenses. However, the trial court found that
they lacked the appropriate intent to commit the crime. The evidence against the
Workmans included photographs of Kelly and their daughter in compromising or
inappropriate positions. There was also evidence that Mrs. Workman had received
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money from Kelly. Finally, evidence was introduced that Kelly had engaged in sexually
related incidents with the seven year old daughter.
This court upheld the trial court's ruling. It relied on the fact that Mrs. Workman
dealt with the incidents of inappropriate behavior as they arose. A number of the
photographs appeared to be spontaneous as opposed to posed.

Mrs. Workman

received only eighty-five dollars from Kelly. Finally, Mrs. Workman cooperated with
the investigation of Kelly.

The court upheld the district court finding that Mrs.

Workman was unaware of the sexual exploitation of her daughter and that she did not
attempt to conceal Kelly's crimes.
The facts in the instant case are analogous to Workman Pinder and the appellant
were cooperating with the investigation through counsel. They traveled to Utah at the
request of counsel and appellant left Pinder in Las Vegas at the request of counsel.
Their travel and living situation were not intended to hinder prevent or delay the
discovery, apprehension, prosecution, conviction or punishment of Pinder.

The

evidence with respect to the appellant's intent was sufficiently improbable so that
reasonable minds would have entertained a reasonable doubt that the appellant had
the proper intent to commit the offense of obstructing justice. Consequently, the
appellant's judgement and conviction should be reversed and the case remanded to the
district court with an order that a judgement of acquittal be entered.
CONCLUSION
The failure to establish a corpus delecti of the offense of obstructing justice by
clear and convincing evidence requires that the appellant's judgement and conviction
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be reversed and that the case be remanded to the district court with an order that a
judgement of acquittal be entered. The insufficiency of the evidence for that offense
likewise requires that the judgement and conviction be reversed and the case be
remanded to the district court with an order that a judgement of acquittal be entered.
DATED this ^

, 2000

day of

G. FRED METOS
Attorney for Appellant
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed/hand delivered
on this 2 4 . day of
flAj*,)
2000, to:
Utah Attorney General
Criminal Appeals Division
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, UT84114
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1

during this entire timeframe.

2

purpose, and all of her acts are consistent with that

3

purpose.

4

which, your Honor, has ruled is admissible.

5

Finder's response to that about the death warrant.

That's her continuing

That's also integral to the second statement

6

That's all we have.

John

We would resist the

7

motion to dismiss and would suggest that these are all

8

questions for the jury.

9
10

MR. BRASS:

In the alternative to limit

argument .

11

MR. WIMS :

12

THE COURT:

What argument would you like not

MR. BRASS:

To argue that driving in your own

13

to

--

14
15

vehicle

IS I o r

17
l

l

five

offense

8 I about

$

20
21

22
23
24

25

We think they're jury -•

from
days,

a crime

to M e s q u i t e

even w i t h

who h a s

lawyers

who's

who

talking

are

of

a suspect
to the

four

in

an

police

--

Okay.

MR.

I don't

BRASS:

obligation

who's

o v e r the c o u r s e

someone

THE COURT:

I affirmative
person

Idaho

a suspect

THE C O U R T :

for

think

any

there's

citizen

to t u r n

in a c r i m e , m e r e l y

The

Court

any

a

in a

suspect.

w i l l deny y o u r

motion.

Make sure that I rule on everything here
The corpus thing was I think the most
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troubling to me because this is the type that's kind
of related to destruction of evidence, somebody that's
charged with witness tampering or those kinds of
crimes.

And it just seems to me that this is the type

of crimes where the very nature of the crime means
that there may not be a lot of corroborating evidence
available.

That doesn't change the State's

requirement to corroborate the statement of a person
who admits a crime.

I think that the case law says

there must be some corroborating evidence.
In the case of the cleaning of the car, there
has been evidence, all though you did a pretty
effective job of cross-examination on it, but that's
not what I'm supposed to do, at this point, is to
evaluate the evidence.

If they accept the State's

evidence, I think that there is enough corroboration
there that they could find that she participated in
cleaning of that truck knowing that a crime had been
committed.

Whether or not she had been in contact

with an attorney or Mr. Pinder had been in contact
with the attorney, I don't think is relevant with
respect to the crime charged.

There isn't any license

that a person can commit acts that would be a crime
merely because there have been some communication with
an attorney or even directions by an attorney.
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And so the fact that they had not been
charged, or even if it was in the paper that they were
not a suspect, that's not relevant.

The issue is

whether or not she knew that a crime had been
committed, not what the general public or somebody
else might have known.

And there is that before the

jury, that she knew that a crime had been committed,
and did she do specific acts to commit the crime.
And one of the acts that's relied upon, and I
was reminded, and having been reminded, I specifically
recall the testimony was that she had said that they
intended to take her car, which she had control over
and would have the ability to not take or offer for
transportation in these circumstances, so that they
wouldn't be stopped by police.

Certainly the

apprehension of somebody who she knew, according to
the State's evidence, had committed a crime would be
obstruction of justice, offering her vehicle knowing
that he had committed a crime and taking him to
Nevada.
And that registration, I think that's for the
jury to decide.

You know, I can hear the argument if

she was going to hide, she should have given a
different name or done a lot of things, but she did
give a Utah license plate when her vehicle was
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registered in Idaho.

And I suppose that that is

something that the jury can find was in furtherance of
her attempting to keep Mr. Pinder from the police -not make him available to the police.
And, certainly, the gun.

There's evidence

that the gun was available through her.

She did own a

gun and her statement that she provided it.
The bag.

In the light most favorable to the

State, the issue is what she thought was in the bag,
not what was in the bag.
to an intent.

And I think that it does go

If the State would not have introduced

the evidence, I think that you would have -- I'm not
going to try your case.

I don't know whether you

would have -- but certainly based upon that statement,
I don't think that the State should be criticized for
bringing the fact to the jury's attention that the
results of the test would indicate that wasn't
Mr. Pinder's -- excuse me, it wasn't the victims'
blood on some items and that other items were just
inconclusive.
MR. BRASS:

Not conclusive.

There's the one

stain that might not even be human blood.
blood is tested, is Pinder's.

But what

It's all Pinder's.

And, by the way, I mean, I'm not criticizing the State
for doing that, my observation of Mr. Wims is that he
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TAB 2
SPECIAL VERDICT

IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
DUCHESNE COUNTY, DUCHESNE DEPARTMENT
STATE OF UTAH,

]
SPECIAL VERDICT

Plaintiff,
vs.

;
)

BARBARA J. DEHART,

)

Defendant.

])

Criminal No. 981800119

If youfindthe defendant, Barbara J. DeHart, GUILTY, you mustfillout this Special
Verdict form. If youfindthe defendant NOT GUILTY, you do not need tofillout this Special
Verdict form.

We, the Jury impaneled in the above entitled case,findthe defendant, Barbara J. DeHart,
GUILTY of Obstructing Justice, as charged in the First Amended Information. In arriving at
our GUILTY verdict, we unanimously agree:
1. That in the time period from on or about October 25, 1998, through November 7,
1998;
2. The defendant, Barbara J. DeHart, knew that another had committed either Aggravated
Murder or Murder in Duchesne County, State of Utah; and
3. The defendant, Barbara J. DeHart, had the intent to hinder, prevent, or delay the
discovery, apprehension, prosecution, conviction, or punishment of another for the crimes
of either Aggravated Murder or Murder; AND

4. Please select one or more of the following as applicable:
_/jg_k.

In arriving at our GUILTY verdict, we unanimously agree that the
Defendant Barbara J. DeHart HARBORED OR CONCEALED
THE OFFENDER.

B.

In arriving at our GUILTY verdict, we unanimously agree that the
Defendant Barbara J. DeHart PROVIDED THE OFFENDER
WITH A WEAPON, TRANSPORTATION, DISGUISE, OR
OTHER MEANS FOR AVOIDING DISCOVERY OR
APPREHENSION.

C.

In arriving at our GUILTY verdict, we unanimously agree that the
Defendant Barbara J. DeHart CONCEALED, DESTROYED, OR
ALTERED ANY PHYSICAL EVIDENCE THAT MIGHT AID
IN THE DISCOVERY, APPREHENSION, OR CONVICTION
OF THE PERSON.

FgREMAN
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IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
DUCHESNE COUNTY, DUCHESNE DEPARTMENT
—oooOooo—
STATE OF UTAH,

:
JUDGMENT AND ORDER

Plaintiff,

:

vs.
:
BARBARA J. DEHART,

Criminal No. 981800119

:

Defendant.

:

Judge A. Lynn Payne

—oooOooo—
OBSTRUCTING JUSTICE - A SECOND DEGREE FELONY
The above-entitled case came before the Court for Sentencing on Monday, August 17,
1999, the Honorable Judge A. Lynn Payne, presiding. The defendant was present and
represented by her attorney, Edward K. Brass. The State of Utah was represented by Herbert
Wm. Gillespie, Duchesne County Attorney, and Michael D. Wims, Assistant Utah Attorney
General. Statements were made by counsel for the parties and the defendant.
NOW THEREFORE, based upon the file and record herein, it is hereby ORDERED,
ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:

DEPUTY

That the defendant has been convicted by a jury of her peers of the offense of
Obstructing Justice, a Second Degree Felony, in violation of Section 76-8-306 UCA (1953) as
amended.
That for the offense of Obstructing Justice, a Second Degree Felony, it is hereby
ordered that the defendant is sentenced to serve a term of not less than one (1) nor more than
fifteen (15) years in the Utah State Prison and pay a fine and surcharge in the sum of $1,000.
The foregoing prison sentence is suspended and the defendant is placed on thirty-six (36) months
supervised probation on the following terms and conditions:
1. The defendant shall not discuss this case with Melissa Cowles or Damian Cowles.
2. The defendant shall not encourage anyone to say things that are untruthful in
connection with this case or the State v. John R. Pinder or State v. Filomeno Valenchia Ruiz
cases.
3. The defendant shall not possess or consume alcohol or be where alcohol is being
possessed or consumed.
4. The defendant shall sign the regular probation agreement with Adult Probation and
Parole and abide by all the terms and conditions of the agreement.
5. The defendant shall keep this Court and her probation officer informed of her current
address and report to the Court whenever requested to do so.
6. The defendant shall pay the sum of $ 1,000 on terms set forth by Adult Probation and
Parole. The $1,000 includes the surcharge.
7. The defendant shall not have any contact with any of the State's witnesses in this case,
the State v. John R. Pinder case, or State v. Filomeno Valenchia Ruiz case. This condition does
not include contact with Melissa Cowles or Damian Cowles.

8. The defendant shall carry with her at all times the identification card provided to her
by Adult Probation and Parole and present the identification card to any law enforcement officer
she comes in contact with.
9. The defendant shall complete an evaluation recommended by Adult Probation and
Parole and successfully complete any counseling or mental health program recommended by the
evaluation at the direction of Adult Probation and Parole.
10. The defendant shall serve one (1) year in the Duchesne County Jail. This sentence
may be reviewed in eight (8) months. Review date is set on April 26, 2000.
DATED this

C&

day of August, 1999.
BY ORDER OF THE COURT

A.L 1
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
Approved as to form:

Edward K. Brass
Attorney for Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the /tf& day of August, 1999,1 mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing proposed Judgment and Order to the attorney for the defendant, at:
Edward K. Brass
Attorney at Law
321 South 600 East
Salt Lake City UT 84102
by depositing the same in the U. S. Mail, Duchesne, Utah.

Legal Assistant

State of Utah vs Barbara J. DeHart
Case No. 981800119
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the
the foregoing Judgement and Order to:
Edward K. Brass
Attorney at Law
321 South 600 East
Salt Lake City UT 84102

day of August, 1999,1 mailed a true and correct copy of

and to
Adult Probation and Parole
PO Box 1823
Roosevelt UT 84066
by depositing the same in the United States Post Office at Duchesne, Utah.

Legal Assistant

